“The activity and influence of shareholder activists in Germany has reached a new high. Recent success cases resulted in a situation in which a company’s size and good market position no longer protect it from becoming an activism target. With activists’ increasing boldness to also approach large and well-known companies, we see a new urge at German board levels to prepare for a potential defense scenario or to rethink their corporate strategy to prevent an attack before it occurs.”

Michael Reinert, Chairman

Country:
Germany

Country: Germany

Average % of insider ownership:

3.58

Activism
Threat Level


To learn more about this country, please click on the tabs below


Following steady historical growth, 2017 marked a new record of shareholder activism campaigns in Germany. The focus thereby moved from mainly small- and mid-cap targets to an increasing number of companies in the German MDax and Dax/large-cap space. The success of recent campaigns has built confidence and a sound basis for established and new activists alike to target German companies with various attack points – be it a wide free float, a strong cash position, a complex conglomerate structure, corporate governance issues or a lucrative “squeeze-out” M&A situation.

Shareholders reaching, exceeding, or dropping below a three percent threshold must disclose their voting interests within four business days.

Disclosure of information on aims, origin of funds, and planned influence on the management of the company is required if the voting interests reach or exceed ten percent.

When shareholders reach a five percent threshold, they receive the right to call for a general meeting and propose amendments to the general meeting agenda (e.g., resolutions to remove supervisory board members). Additionally, at five percent or more shareholders gain the right to block a squeeze-out of minority shareholders.

Once shareholders reach ten percent, they receive significantly more control and may nominate members of the supervisory board in a privileged way and gain an individual vote on dismissal of management. At this threshold, shareholders may block a merger-related squeeze-out of minority shareholders.

Management is generally ring-fenced by the two-tier management board/supervisory board structure, hence nominations for the management board cannot be proposed by shareholders (they are appointed by the supervisory board). But recent cases demonstrate that this is not a guarantee.

Preventive structural defenses include preference shares (non-voting shares), restricted transferability of registered shares, supervisory board protection via 75 percent threshold for deselection on annual meetings or staggered terms of members of the supervisory board, but both are under scrutiny from institutional investors.

Companies have other strategic options such as share buybacks, divestment of non-core assets, growth via acquisition of a compatible asset, an increase of authorized capital, or winning an anchor shareholder.


Top Campaigns by Type

1. Removal of CEO or Other Board Member
2. Gain Board Representation
3. Remuneration

Campaigns By Year

Total
Campaigns

72

Notable Invested Activists

Knight Vinke Asset Management
Wyser-Pratte Management Co
Elliott Management

Recent activism campaigns

Uniper SE
VS.
Knight Vinke Asset Management
Commerzbank
VS.
Petrus Advisers
OHB SE
VS.
Wyser-Pratte Management Co

Total Active
Campaigns

20

Contact FTI Consulting

Dr. Lutz Golsch

Senior Managing Director
+49 69 920 37 110
Lutz.Golsch@fticonsulting.com